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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an action by Albertson's, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Albertson's") against Honorable Robert B. Hansen, Attorney 
General of Utah, and Honorable R. Paul Van Dam, County 
Attorney of Salt Lake County, seeking a declaratory judgment 
that its retail sales promotion known as "Double Cash Bingo" 
is not subject to prosecution as "gambling" or a "lottery" 
within the terms of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 1101, Utah 
Code Annotated (1977 Supplement). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE BELOW 
This action was commenced by plaintiff filing a ~omplaint 
and, later, an amended complaint for declaratory judgment. 
Defendant Van Dam filed a motion to dismiss (R.44). Defendant 
Hansen also filed a motion to dismiss (R.59). Plaintiff filed 
a motion for summary judgment that "it is not subject to pros-
ecution for violation of the Utah Penal Code for conducting 
'Double Cash Bingo' " (R.95). There was no dispute among the 
parties as to any material fact. On April 4, 1978, after a 
hearing on the cross-motions, the District Court entered judgment 
dismissing plaintiff's action and denying plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment (R.149-150). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent requests that the judgment of the lower 
court be affirmed. 
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THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Respondent Van Dam takes no substantial exception to the 
facts as stated in the Appellant's statement entitled "Eveni:_s_ 
Leading to the Actions Connnencement" (4 .A.). The Respondent 
does, however, take issue with the Appellant's interpretation 
of "the statutes" (4.B). The Respondent will address the Ls, 
of statutory construction under Point I of his argument enti '.i 
"Double Cash Bingo" IS UNLAWFUL UNDER THE TER.~S OF UTAH CODI: 
ANNOTATED §76-10-1101, ET SEQ. (1977 Supp.) infra. In additi 
the Respondent takes issue with the Appellant's statement 
entitled "Defendant's Motions" (4.D.). As this statement re!i 
to the interpretations of the principal case (Geis v. Con tine:~ 
Oil Co. , 29 Utah 2d 452, 5ll P2d 725) relied on by the Respom1 
and tends to be argumentative, this point will be covered undt 
Point I of his argument. 
ARG~NT 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ENTERED 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND 
DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
POINT I. 
"DOUBLE CASH BINGO" IS UNLAWFUL UNDER 
THE TERMS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
SECTION 76-10-1101, ET SEO. (1977 SUPP.) 
1. Participants in Double Cash Bingo Provided Valuable 
Consideration Anticipated by the Plaintiff, by Appearing at~ 
Plaintiff's Place of Business and Thereby Subjecting Themse~ 
-2-
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to the Sales Appeal of the Plaintiff's Assorted Merchandise. 
Respondent Van Dam maintains that the Utah case of Geis v. 
Continental Oil Company, 29 Utah 2d 452, 511 P.2d 725 (1973) 
speaks directly to the issues raised by the Plaintiff (R.45). 
Boththe Plaintiff and the Defendants agree that three elements 
are necessary in order for a lottery to exist: (1) a prize, 
(2) an element of chance; and (3) consideration. The Geis 
case addressed a promotional contest similar to "Double Cash 
Bingo". The plaintiff, claiming to be a winner under the terms 
of the contest, brought suit to enforce the "contract". The 
Utah Supreme Court examined the elements of the contest and 
determined that the three necessary elements - prize, chanc.e 
and ~onsideration were present. The Court addressed the issue 
of consideration by referring to a Washington State case, 
Shillberg v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 75 Wash. 2d 339, 450 P.2d 
949 (1969). The Washington Court, relying on State v. Danz, 
140 Wash. 546, 250 P.37, found that a visit to a Safeway Store 
and exposure to the promoter's advertising amounted to consid-
eration. 
"The players wagered their time, attention, 
thought, energy and money spent in transpor-
tation to the store for a chance to win a prize 
- all of which constituted a valuable consider-
ation moving from the players to the promoter." 
In discussing the consideration element, the Utah court noted 
that sufficient consideration to enforce a contract existed 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
but held that being a lottery, the contract was illegal and, 
therefore, unenforceable. 
" ... this court would be engaging in 
some type of sophistry to hold that there 
was consideration present to support a 
bargain but not to provide the element 
of consideration to constitute a lottery." 
In addition, the Utah court noted in the Geis decision, 
that the Danz interpretation of consideration was adopted in 
the earlier Utah case of Blair v. Lowham, 73 Utah 599, 276 P. 
292 (1929). It is, therefore, possible to conclude that Utah ' 
precedence exists for the proposition that sufficient consider· 
ation exists to support a lottery where prizes attract patrom 
to a business and to its advertising. 
Gambling activities prior to 1973 were governed by Title 
76, Chapter 27 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953). The chapter 
was entitled "Gaming" and prohibited card games, roulette, dic1 
and "other gambling devices of any nature or kind whatsoever 
used or kept for the purpose of playing for money, or for tokej 
redeemable in money, at any of the games mentioned in this 
chapter ... ". "Lottery" was separately defined in Section 76-
27-9, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as" ... any scheme for the 
disposal or distribution of property by chance among persons 
who have paid, or promised to pay, any valuable consideration 
for the chance of obtaining such property ... " The card games 
and mechanical devices outlined in Section 76-27-1, Utah Code. 
Annotated (1953), were punishable as a felony, whereas the lottl 
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was punishable as a misdemeanor, Section 76-27-10, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). 
In 1973 the legislature revised the State's criminal code 
including the gambling statutes. Part 11 created a single mis-
demeanor known as "Gambling". Gambling is defined to include 
" ... risking anything of value for a return or risking anything 
of value upon the outcome of a contest, game, gaming scheme or 
device when the return or outcome is based upon an element of 
chance ... " The new definition includes the games specifically 
outlined in the previous Section 76-27-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
and "lotteries" which maintains the same definition as that pro-
vided in the previous statute. Part 11 is similar to the preceding 
statute in the most critical of provisions, specifically: 
(1) "Lottery" means any scheme for 
the disposal or distribution of property 
by chance among persons who have paid or 
promised to pay any valuable consideration 
for the chance of obtaining property ... " 
The new statutory provisions, §76-10-1101(2), Utah Code 
Annotated (1977 Supp.) and the previous statutory provision, 
§76-27-9, Utah Code Annotated (1953), are identical. 
(2) The concept of "value" remains the same 
in the new statute as in the old: 
" ... any game played with cards, dice or 
any other device, for money, checks, 
credit or any other representative of 
value is guilty of a felony ... " U.C.A., 
§76-10-1101(3) (1977 Supp.) 
-5-
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Although participants in Double Cash Bingo were not 
required to make any purchase or otherwise pay for the oppor-
tunity to play bingo, the participants nonetheless provided 
a valuable consideration sufficient to support a lottery. 
The Second Restatement of Contracts Section 75 provides: 
"(l) To constitute consideration, a 
performance or a return promise must 
be bargained for, (2) A performance or 
return promise is bargained for if it 
is sought by the promise or in exchange 
for his promise and is given by the 
promisee in exchange for that promise ... " 
Under the rules of Double Cash Bingo, the player was required 
to enter an Albertson's store in order to obtain the necessar, 
"bingo" playing card and bingo disks. The necessary playing 
pieces were not sent out through the mail nor could they be 
obtained in newspaper advertisements by Albertson's. Once~ 
playing card was obtained, repeated trips to an Albertson's 
store were necessary for a player to increase the chances of :1 
winning. Under this scheme, the thing that Albertson's "bargaJ 
for" was the presence of the individual in an Albertson's sto:i 
The presence of the individual in an Albertson's store was of 
"value", in that once in the store the individual was exposed 
to in-store advertising, displays and a shopping environment 
designed to encourage the purchase of goods. The presence in 
the store itself is, without question, consideration to suppo: 
the contract. 
-6-
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Another way to look to the "value " of consideration, 
after establishing a "benefit" to the promisor (plaintiff), is 
to determine if there is a "detriment" to the promisee (patron). 
Certainly the elements outlined in Shillberg, can be classified 
as a "detriment": 
"The players wagered their time, attention, 
thought, energy and money spent in trans-
portation to the store for a chance to win 
a prize ... " 
All of these elements are measurable, of value and are exactly 
what the promisor (Albertson's) bargained for. The promisee 
(patron) was put to a disadvantage (detriment), in the form of 
lost opportunity to patronize other supermarkets and perhaps 
save money. 
The Plaintiff claims that the benefit realized from the 
participants presence in an Albertson's store is "too remote" 
to constitute consideration. This defense lacks support 
that the cases cited by the Plaintiff can be distinguished on 
the facts. In addition, the Plaintiff claims in its "Statement 
of the Case" (Plaintiff's Brief on Appeal) that: 
" ... Albertson's discontinued the game on 
March 3 and has lost substantial sales 
and good will as a result." 
It is, therefore, clear that "valuable consideration" did, in 
fact, exist and that Plaintiff's scheme was, in fact, a lottery. 
2. Double Cash Bingo is not a lawful business transaction 
exempted by Part 11. 
The new statute, Section 76-10-1101, Utah Code Annotated 
-7-
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(1977 Supp.), enacted in 1973, departed from its predecessor 
by providing two exceptions: 
(a) A lawful business transaction, and 
(b) Playing an amusement device that confers 
only by an immediate and unrecorded right of 
replay not exchangeable for value. 
The Plaintiff contends that the term "lawful business transacti.I 
is not defined by the statute and, therefore, ought to be con-
strued liberally in its favor, in that Double Cash Bingo is the 
type of business transaction anticipated by the exemption. 
Although the term "lawful business transaction" is not 
defined within the statute itself, the term has been interprete1 
in a commentary on the revised criminal code. Mr. Loren Dale 
1 
Martin writes in "Utah Criminal Code Outline", that the term 
"lawful business transaction" was intended to exclude such 
activities as investing in the stock market, speculating in 
real estate and other similar business transactions where an 
element of unpredictability exists. Obviously, this exemption 
was intended to apply only to recognized, legitimate transactioj 
within the business world and not to sporadic advertising schena 
camouflaged to evade the lottery statute. 
It must be noted, in conclusion, that notwithstanding the I 
' 
definition of "lawful business transaction" the punctuation ano 
' 
sentence construction of Section 76-10-1101, Utah Code Annotate;I 
I 
1 ''Utah Criminal Code Outline", Loren Dale Martin (1973). ' 
-8-
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(1977 Supp.) clearly indicates that a "lawful business trans-
action" cannot include a lottery". 
(1) "Gambling" means risking anything of 
value for a return or risking anything of 
value on the outcome of a contest, game, 
gaming scheme, or gaming device when the 
return or outcome is based upon an element 
of chance and is in accord with an agree-
ment or understanding that someone will 
receive something of value in the event 
of a certain outcome, and gambling includes 
a lottery; ... " 
The semi-colon indicates the conclusion of a thought ". 
gambling includes a lottery; " The statute then continues 
to list what gambling is not. A "lawful business transaction" 
is excluded but, note, that even if a lottery were part of a 
business transaction it would be invalid under the statute, as 
"gambling includes a lottery ... " 
The Plaintiff further claims that Double Cash Bingo is 
not accompanied by the vices generally associated with gambling. 
Certainly, it would be naive and an over-reaction to maintain 
that such an enterprise would lead to the extremes associated 
with organized crime and gambling, but it is important to 
recognize that such schemes appeal to the same "something for 
nothing" attraction that gambling anticipates. Perhaps the 
Washington State Supreme Court best stated the inequity of 
such schemes in the Schillberg case: 
"The anti-gambling laws are designed not 
only to prevent loss but to preclude some 
kinds of- gain to the promoter of a lottery 
-9-
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from reaping an unearned harvest at the 
expense of his players; to prevent the wary 
from preying upon the unwary; and to discourage 
the overly-shrewd from exploiting the natural 
yearing in most everyone to get something for 
nothing; and to put a damper on the actions of 
those who receive from the vice much more than 
they part with in prizes. If, under our mores, 
it is bad for a man to lose his property on pure 
chance or lot, it is equally bad for a man to 
gain property on the same pure chance or lot." 
Similarly, in State v. Fox Kansas Theater Co., 144 Kan. 687, 
62 P. 2d 929 (1936), (Citing Central States Theatre Corporation 
v. Patz (D.C.) llF. Supp 566, the court stated: 
"Conducting in motion picture theatre of 
advertising scheme called "Bank Night" 
held to appeal to cupidity of public and 
spirit of gambling and speculation, to be 
unfair and contrary to public safety, and 
so closely border on conducting of a lot-
tery as not to entitle theatre corporation 
to injunction to restrain interference with 
operation of scheme." 
It is this disparity between what is given for a "chance" 
of a return and that many may give while few will receive, whi1 
makes the lottery such a socially distasteful and hence pro-
hibited enterprise. Double Cash Bingo exploits the individual 
to the advantage of the promoter. 
3. Double Cash Bingo is a Violation of the Utah Penal Col: 1 by Reason of the Geis Decision. 
A. The Geis Decision is applicable to this case. Al thoug' 
the Geis case was decided upon the previous gambling statute -
Section 76-27-1, et seq. Utah Code Annotated (1953), which was 
subsequently replaced by Section 76-10-110, et seq. Utah Code 
-10-
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Annotated (1977 Supp.), the case remains just as applicable 
as before. As explained earlier, the revised statute did not 
change the concept of "value" from that defined in the prior 
statute. In addition, the "lawful business" exemption, although 
not present in the previous statute, ·does not apply to the 
lottery scheme employed by the Plaintiff. 
It is important at this point to determine exactly what 
the Utah Supreme Court considered when it decided the Geis case. 
The original action was brought by Mrs. Geis against Conoco to 
recover a prize in a promotional contest similar to that con-
ducted by Albertson's. Mrs. Geis claimed that she had fully 
complied with the rules and requirements set out by Conoco. The 
trial court found for Mrs. Geis, and Conoco appealed the findings 
to the State Supreme Court claiming that Mrs. Geis did not properly 
accept Conoco's offer as required by the contest rules. Upon 
review the Utah Supreme Court considered the legality of a contest 
and, hence, the contract in issue. It reviewed the statutory 
elements of a lottery and discussed the impact of the Washington 
State case of Shillberg (citing Danz) in regard to consideration. 
The Washington Court found that consideration existed in the form 
of time, attention, thought, energy and money spent in trans-
portation for a chance to win a prize. Although the Utah Supreme 
Court did not accept the language of the Washington Court 
specifically, the only logical determination can be that the 
Utah Supreme Court tacitly adopted the language, as the sentence 
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which follows the consideration discussion reads: 
"It is true that in some jurisdictions, it 
has been held that a lottery is a special 
kind of contract, which requires a special 
kind of consideration, such as money or its 
equivalent, which will improverish the in-
dividual who parts with it. However, in 
light of this state's constitutional mandate 
and legislative enactments pursuant thereto, 
this court would be engaging in some type of 
sophistry to hold that there was consideration 
present to support a bargain but not to provide 
the element of consideration to constitute a 
lottery." 
The Utah Supreme Court held the contract was a lottery and, 
therefore, unenforceable. The contract was a lottery because 
all of the necessary statutory elements, including considen4 
were present. The only reasonable conclusion is that the Utal 
Supreme Court adopted the Washington State Supreme Court's int< 
pretation of consideration. 
B. The reasoning set forth in the Geis case to the effec 
that time, attention, thought_, energy and other costs such as 
transportation related to a promotional scheme should consti~ 
"valuable consideration" is well-founded and should be adoptec1 
by this Court. It has been demonstrated in the previous sectil 
of this brief, that promotional schemes such as Double Cash 
Bingo are not exempted by Part 11 under the "business trans-
action" exclusion. In addition, the concept of "valuable con· 
sideration" remains the same under the revised statute - Secti: 
76-10-1101 et seq. Utah Code Annotated (1977 Supp.), as under 1 
the previous gambling statute - Section 76-27-1 et seq. Utah 
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Code Annotated (1953). Therefore, the Geis decision should be 
applied to Double Cash Bingo and all other promotional schemes 
of the same or similar nature. 
The Plaintiff cites a number of cases in support of its 
contention that the §hillberg decision regarding consideration, 
"flies in the face of common sense and has been rejected by one 
jurisdiction after another." The Plaintiff does cite one case 
- Cudd v. Aschenbrenner, 233 Or. 272, 377 P.2d 150 (1962), which 
is similar to the case in question, as it involves a supermarket 
promotional scheme. It is possible to distinguish the two cases 
on the facts, however. The Cudd case, for instance, involved a 
drawing conducted in the parking lot adjacent to the supermarket, 
thus avoiding the advertising exposure present in the Albertson's 
case. Aside from the factual differences, it must be recognized 
that the Cudd case was decided by an Oregon Court and the Utah 
court is not bound by Oregon precedent, especially where the Utah 
Court has established its own precedent on the question of 
valuable consideration. 
In addition to Cudd, the Plaintiff cites a number of other 
cases from foreign jurisdictions concerning a promotional scheme 
popular with movie theaters in the 1930's called "Bank Night", 
People v. Cardas, 137 Cal. App. Supp. 788, 28 P.2d 100 (1933), 
State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corp., 114 
Mont. 52, 137 P. 2d 689 (1949), etc. The "bank night" cases 
differ from each other factually and in the results of the 
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decisions. Regardless of this split in decisions, the cases 
are of little, if any, assistance in evaluating the Double 
Bonus Bingo scheme. In all of the "bank night" cases cited b!; 
the Plaintiff, not one was from Utah. The Utah Court, therefc; 
is not bound to follow the decisions of other jurisdictions, 
esoecially in light of the more recent Geis case. 
4. Double Cash Bingo is a criminal act by reason of the 
terms of the authority stated in Article VI, Section 28 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution provides 
"The Legislature shall not authorize any game of 
chance, lottery or gift enterprise under any pre-
tense or for any purpose." 
Section 28 prohibits not only acts by the Legislature but acts 
by any person, as demonstrated by the action of the legislatui 
in passing the previous gambling statute - Section 76-27-1 ~ 
Utah Code Annotated (1977 Supp.). The constitutional prohibitl 
against lotteries does not provide criminal penalties, but~ 
mandate that the legislature "shall not authorize ... " delegatt1 
sufficient authority to the legislature to enact criminal law:I 
to punish lottery schemes. 
POINT II 
THE REVISED GAMBLING STATUTE IS NOT VOID 
FOR VAGUENESS. 
Section 76-10-1101, Utah Code Annotated (1977 Supp) defir 
"gambling" as: 
" ... risking anything of value for a return 
or risking anything of value upon the out-
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come of a contest, game, gaming scheme, or 
gaming device when the return or outcome 
is based upon an element of chance and is 
in accord with an agreement or understanding 
that someone will receive something of value 
in the event of a certain outcome, and gam-
bling includes a lottery ... " 
The Plaintiff rightly states that "every event in life is based 
upon an 'element of chance"'. The Plaintiff then claims that 
the statute provides no hint as to what an "element of chance" 
may be. This statement is merely a subterfuge on the part of 
the Plaintiff to avoid the obvious. The statute is clearly 
directed to schemes and devices which allow the promoter to 
exploit the unwary through appealing to the "something for 
nothing" yearning in almost everyone. The statute is necessarily 
broad in order to encompass the variety of schemes and devices 
invented by the creative mind of the clever promotor and allow 
for future developments in this area. The statute is not over-
broad, however, as it provides exemption for lawful business 
transactions where both parties to the transaction deal on 
equal footing. It also provides exemption for amusement where 
there is no exchange of value. The terms of the statute are by 
no means so vague that reasonable men could not determine their 
intended meaning, therefore, there is not violation of the due 
process clause of either the United States Constitution nor the 
Utah Constitution. 
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CONCLUSION 
Double Cash Bingo is a "lottery" within the prohibition , 
of the "gambling" terms of the present Utah Penal Code. The 
revised gambling statute - Section 76-10-1101 et seq. Utah Coo• 
Annotated (1977 Supp.) is clear in its provisions and is not 
unconstitutionally vague in any manner. The statute is enforc 
against the appellant and the judgment of the lower court shoul 
be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
DONALD SAWAYA 
Chief Civil Deputy County Attorne 
CRAIG ANDERSON 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for the Respondent 
R. Paul Van Dam 
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